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Language as tools for interaction: Grammar 
and the dynamics of ellipsis resolution1
Abstract: In this paper we explore the consequences of defining natural-language 
syntax as procedures for context-dependent interpretation as argued within 
 Dynamic Syntax. Dynamic Syntax is a formalism where both representations of 
content and context are defined dynamically and structurally, with time-linear 
growth across sequences of partial trees as the core notion, presumed to be 
 manipulated by both speaker and hearer alike. The challenge of modelling the 
notorious heterogeneity of ellipsis effects in conversational dialogue is taken as a 
case study for establishing the appropriate concept of context. In the light of the 
success of these assumptions in capturing the diversity of ellipsis within an over-
all explanation, we argue that foundational assumptions like the competence/
performance distinction as regards the nature of linguistic knowledge need to be 
reconsidered. We argue that the grammar needs to be defined in action-based 
terms with incrementality and context-dependence as crucial explanatory no-
tions of syntactic/semantic phenomena. As a consequence of taking this perspec-
tive, we argue that success in communication may rest in the ongoing interaction 
between participants, as underpinned by low-level mechanisms of language 
use  like the grammar, rather than in recognising some intended propositional 
content.
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1  Introduction: Context and the nature of  
natural-language grammars
Readdressing the question of what assumptions to make about the grammar 
has become urgent, since, despite all the work done by semanticists and prag-
matists in emphasising just how important context is to language processing, 
we  still have no clear understanding of what an appropriate notion of context 
consists in. Ellipsis provides striking illustration. Arguably it might be expected 
to constitute a window on context, given the informal observation that ellipsis 
is  where things can be left out because context enables the missing parts to 
be filled in. Yet, no such uniform explanation is in sight: to the contrary, ellip-
sis  is  taken to be “fractally heterogeneous” (Ginzburg and Cooper 2004; Mer-
chant  forthcoming). In our view, this is because current sentence-based gram-
mars bifurcate ellipsis, and all context-dependent phenomena, into those 
which are sentence-bound, and hence explicable grammar-internally, and those 
which are not, despite the apparent similarities between both types. Data 
deemed to be outside the remit of standard grammatical frameworks, along with 
the ambiguities generated by the multiple forms of resolutions allowed by the 
grammar, are then presumed to fall under some performance-based account. 
This paper shows that such a view does not survive the challenge posed by the 
data of ellipsis in conversational dialogue where neither standard Gricean per-
formance models nor competence-based grammatical analyses appear adequate 
to provide the requisite uniform accounts. We take these in order below, explor-
ing first the general problems which current Gricean theoretical assumptions are 
increasingly facing as accounts of processing in dialogue. We then turn to the 
data of ellipsis in conversational dialogue as the catalyst for exploring a set of 
alternatives.
1.1  Challenges to Gricean programmes for pragmatics
The theoretical hurdle to providing a unitary explanation for some requisite 
 concept of context is the now familiar discrepancy between representations 
 delivered by the grammar, i.e. syntax/semantics mappings (“sentence mean-
ings”  or encoded content), and “speaker meanings” (conveyed content). This 
led  to the Gricean account of meaningNN, (Grice 1975) to become the point 
of   departure for many subsequent pragmatic models (see Levinson 1983; 
Bach  1997;  Bach and Harnish 1982; Cohen et al. 1990, Searle 1969, among 
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others).2 From that perspective, it has been seen as necessary that, beyond some 
modular linguistic knowledge, itself inadequate to deliver semantically-evaluable 
objects, communication should essentially involve notions of rationality and 
 cooperation. In certain versions, this is interpreted as the requirement that 
 communication must be guided by reasoning about mental states. Under some 
definitions, speakers must, in  order to communicate, have (at least) fourth order 
thoughts and hearers must  recover the speaker’s meaning through reasoning 
about these thoughts. At least then for some forms of ellipsis (‘pragmatic ellipsis’, 
Stainton 2006), the most prevalent in conversational data, this threatens to 
 involve a model that relies heavily in mind-reading in order to resolve the gap 
between the fragment uttered and the speech act performed (see e.g. Poesio and 
Rieser 2010).
In contrast to mindreading accounts of communication, Millikan (1984: ch. 3) 
argues that the Gricean conception of meaningNN in ruling out causal effects on 
the audience does not capture ordinary linguistic understanding, which is not at 
basis inferentially mediated. The alternative that she proposes, to the contrary, 
examines language and communication on the basis of phenomena studied by 
evolutionary biology, with linguistic understanding seen as analogous to “direct 
perception” rather than reasoning (see also McDowell 1980).3 Objects of ordinary 
perception, e.g. vision, are no less abstract than linguistic meanings, both requir-
ing contextual enrichment in order to be comprehended. Yet, in the case of ordi-
nary perception, this processing does not require any consideration of someone’s 
intention. An analogous assumption can then be made as regards linguistic 
 understanding so that the resolution of underspecified input in context does 
not  require considering interlocutors’ mental states as a necessary ingredient. 
Millikan then provides an account of linguistic meaning along a continuum with 
natural meaning based on the function that linguistic devices have been selected 
to perform (their survival value). In contrast then to accounts of intentional 
 action which see the structures involved as distinctive of rational agents, distin-
guishing them from entities exhibiting merely purposive behaviour (see, e.g., 
Bratman 1999: 5), in Millikan’s naturalistic perspective, function, i.e. meaning, 
does not depend upon speaker intentions. Nonetheless, speakers indeed can 
be conceived as behaving purposefully but without representing hearers’ men-
tal  states or having intentions about hearers’ mental states (see also Csibra 
2 Note that our arguments here do not necessarily concern Grice’s philosophical account, in so 
far as it is seen by some as just normative, but its employment in subsequent (psychological/
computational) models of communication/pragmatics.
3 The strict dichotomy between “meaningNN” and “showing” has also been disputed within 
Relevance Theory (see, e.g., Wharton 2003).
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and  Gergely 1998). Similarly, hearers understand speech through direct per-
ception of what the speech is about without necessary reflection on speaker 
 intentions.4
In addition, a range of psycholinguistic research suggests that recognition of 
intentions is an unduly strong psychological condition to impose as a prerequi-
site to effective communication. First, there is the problem of autism and related 
disorders. Autism, despite being reliably associated with inability (or at least 
markedly reduced capacity) to envisage other people’s mental states, is not a syn-
drome precluding first-language learning in high-functioning individuals (Glüer 
and Pagin 2003). Secondly, language acquisition across children is established 
well before the onset of the ability to recognise higher-order intentions (Wellman 
et al. 2001), as evidenced by the so-called ‘false-belief task’ which necessitates 
the child distinguishing what they believe from what others believe (Perner 1991). 
Given that language-learning takes place very largely through the medium of con-
versational dialogue, these results appear to show that at least communication 
with and by children cannot rely on higher-order intention recognition (see also 
Tollefsen 2005).
There is also very considerable independent evidence that even though 
adults are able to think about other people’s perspectives, they are significantly 
influenced by their own point of view (egocentrism) (Keysar 2007). This suggests 
that the complex hypotheses required by Gricean reasoning in communication 
may not reliably be constructed by adults either. This is corroborated by an 
 increasingly large body of research demonstrating that the Gricean notion of 
“common ground” is not a necessary building block in achieving coordinative 
communicative success: speakers regularly violate shared knowledge at first pass 
in the use of anaphoric and referential expressions which supposedly demon-
strate the necessity of established common ground (Keysar 2007, among others).5 
Given this type of observation, checking in parsing or producing utterances that 
information is jointly held by the dialogue participants – the perceived common 
ground – cannot be a necessary condition on such activities. And there is psycho-
linguistic evidence that such neglect of common ground does not significantly 
4 Of course, adults can, and often do, use reflections about the interlocutor’s mental states; 
but the point is that this is not a necessary ingredient for meaningful interaction. Gricean 
mechanisms, that is, can be invoked but only as derivative or in cases of failure of the normal 
functioning of the primary mechanisms involved in the recovery of meaning, such as deception, 
specialised domains of discourse etc.
5 Though ‘audience design’ and coordination effects are regularly observed in experiments 
(see e.g. Hanna et al. 2003), these can be shown to result from general memory-retrieval 
mechanisms rather than as based on some common ground calculation based on 
metarepresentation or reasoning (see Horton and Gerrig 2005; Pickering and Garrod 2004).
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impede successful communication and is not even detected by participants (En-
gelhardt et al. 2006, among others).
1.1.1  Re-thinking the Gricean view as a basis for dialogue modelling
As the Gricean individualistic view that speaker’s intention is the sole determi-
nant of meaning underestimates the role of the hearer, current dialogue models 
have turned to work in philosophy that has begun to explore notions of joint 
agency/joint action/joint intentions (see e.g. Bratman 1990, 1999; Searle 1990; 
Gilbert 2003, among others). Bratman’s account of joint intentions has been taken 
as the basis of modelling participant coordination (see, e.g., Poesio and Rieser 
2010). Here, the controversial notion of ‘intention’ as a psychological state is un-
derpinned by hierarchical planning structures (Bratman 1990), a view generally 
adopted in AI models of communication (see, e.g., Cohen et al. 1990). In this type 
of account, collective intentions are reduced to individual intentions and a 
 network of mutual beliefs. A similar style of analysis features prominently in 
H.  Clark’s model: dialogue involves joint actions built on the coordination of 
 (intention-driven) individual actions based on shared beliefs (common ground) 
(see, e.g., Clark 1996: 59). On such a view, a strong Gricean element reflecting 
reasoning about speakers’ intentions continues to underlie the psycholinguistic 
and computational modelling of dialogue even though it is now supported by an 
account in terms of joint action and conversational structure. Thus, within psy-
cholinguistics and (computational) semantics, the move from individualistic ac-
counts of action, planning and intention in linguistic processing to interaction 
and coordination in dialogue does not mark a radically new perspective but in-
stead presents joint action as derivative.
However, joint action seems to involve a number of lower-level cognitive phe-
nomena that cannot be easily explicated in Gricean terms. We distinguish here 
between the terms coordination and cooperation: cooperation is taken as involv-
ing a defined shared goal between interlocutors, whereas coordination is the dy-
namically matched behaviour of two or more agents so that it might appear that 
there is a joint purpose, whether there is one or not (see also Allott 2008: 15). In 
this respect, psycholinguistic studies on dialogue have demonstrated that when 
individuals engage in joint activity, such as conversation, they become “aligned”, 
i.e., they (unconsciously) synchronise their behaviour at a variety of different 
 levels, e.g., bodily movements, speech patterns etc. These coordinations draw on 
subpersonal, synchronised mechanisms (Pickering & Garrod 2004) or emotional, 
sensory-motor practices that are, crucially, nonconceptual (Gallagher 2001: 81; 
Hutto 2004) and, therefore, not accountable through the high-level logical struc-
tures that Gricean explanations require.
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1.1.2  Joint action and coordination in dialogue: empirical issues
Running alongside this work have been Conversational Analysis accounts of the 
sequential coherence of conversations which emphasise the importance of the 
turn-by-turn organisation of dialogue in allowing juxtaposition of displays of 
 participant understandings and providing structures for organised repair (see 
e.g. Schegloff 2007). Rather than interlocutors having to figure out each other’s 
mental states and plans through metarepresentational means, conversational 
 organisation provides the requisite structure for coordination through repair pro-
cedures and routines. In similar spirit, Garrod and Anderson (1987) observe, in 
task-oriented dialogue experiments, explicit negotiation is neither a preferential 
nor an effective means of coordination, as would be expected to be if reasoning 
about speaker plans and common ground were the primary means of coordina-
tion. Explicit negotiation, if it occurs at all, usually happens after participants 
have already developed some familiarity with the task. Hence, the Interactive 
Alignment model developed by Pickering and Garrod (2004) emphasizes the 
 importance of tacit alignment mechanisms and implicit common ground as the 
primary means of coordination. The establishment of routines and the signifi-
cance of repair as “externalised inference” are also noted by Pickering and 
 Garrod. Further psycholinguistic experiments reported in Mills and Gregoromi-
chelaki (2010) and Mills (2011) suggest that, by probing the process of coordina-
tion in task-oriented dialogue, it can be demonstrated that notions of joint inten-
tions and plans emerge gradually in a regular manner, rather than guiding 
utterance production and interpretation throughout. These observations seem 
consonant with an alternative approach to planning and intention-recognition 
according to which forming and recognising such constructs is a subordinated 
activity to the more basic processes that underlie people’s performance (see e.g. 
Suchman 1987/2007; Agre and Chapman 1990).
Accordingly, when examining human interaction, and more specifically dia-
logue, notions like ‘intentions’ and ‘beliefs’ may enter into common sense psy-
chological explanations that the participants themselves can invoke and manipu-
late, especially when the interaction does not run smoothly. As such they operate 
as resources that interlocutors can utilise explicitly to account for their own and 
others’ behaviour. In this sense, such notions constitute part of the metalanguage 
participants employ to make sense of their actions in conscious, often exter-
nalised reflections (see e.g. Heritage 1984; Mills and Gregoromichelaki 2010; 
Healey 2008). Cognitive models that elevate such resources to causal factors in 
terms of plans, goals etc. either risk not doing justice to the sub-personal, low-
level mechanisms that implement the epiphenomenal effects they describe, or 
they frame their provided explanations as competence/computational level de-
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scriptions (see e.g. Stone 2005). The stance such models take may be seen as in-
nocuous preliminary idealisation; but this is acceptable only in the absence of 
either emerging internal inconsistency or alternative explanations that subsume 
the phenomena under more general assumptions. For example, there are well-
known empirical/conceptual problems with the reduction of agent coordination 
in terms of Bratman’s joint intentions (Searle 1990; Gold and Sugden 2007);6 and 
there are also psychological/practical puzzles in cognitive/computational imple-
mentations in that the plan recognition problem is known to be intractable in 
domain-independent planning (Chapman 1987; Levinson 1995). But, in addition, 
linguistic phenomena seem to escape adequate explanation. We turn to a range 
of such phenomena next where the operation of a low-level mechanism like the 
grammar seems to be crucially implicated in the explanation but where appropri-
ate modelling of the phenomena cannot be accounted for grammar-internally 
given the Gricean assumption that speakers formulate and attempt to transmit 
determinate meanings in conversation.
1.2  Dialogue and interactive structure-building
Amongst the most striking empirical evidence of the problems caused by the 
 bifurcation of sentence- and discourse-based analyses of ellipsis are the data of 
conversational dialogue. In dialogue, utterances are often collaboratively con-
structed, with what is said by individual contributors being highly elliptical 
 because they rely on the context in which the conversation takes place for their 
interpretation:
(1) Context: Friends of the Earth club meeting
 A: So what is that? Is that er . . . booklet or something?
 B: It’s a book
 C:  Book
 B: Just . . . talking about al you know alternative
 D: On erm . . . renewable yeah
 B:  energy really I think. . . . . .
 A: Yeah [BNC:D97]
6 In addition, such accounts of coordination are not general enough in that they are 
discontinuous with explanations of collective actions, in e.g. crowd coordination, individuals 
walking past each other on the sidewalk, etc.
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The major problem for linguistic explanation is that such sub-sentential switches 
(split utterances) with speaker/hearer exchange of roles can take place at any 
point, and across all syntactic dependencies (Purver et al. 2009):
(2) A: I’m afraid I burned the buns.
 B: Did you burn
 A: myself? No, fortunately not.
(3) A: D’you know whether every waitress handed in
 B: her tax forms? 
 A: or even any payslips?
(4) Gardener: I shall need the mattock.
 Home-owner: The . . .
 Gardener: mattock. For breaking up clods of earth. [BNC]
(5) A: or we could just haul: a:ll the skis in the dorms
 B:  we could . . .
    haul all the skis into the dorm
 C:  hh uh hhuhhuh . . .
 B: which . . .
 A: might work
 B: might be the best [BNC]
(6) Jack: I just returned
 Kathy: from . . .
 Jack: Finland [from Lerner 2004]
(2) involves a split between a reflexive pronoun and its antecedent; (3) involves a 
split between a quantifying expression and some pronoun that it binds, and then 
across a disjunction and another shift of speakers to a polarity item dependent on 
that initially presented quantifier and the affective questioning element indicated 
by the first part. (4) involves a split between determiner and noun etc. The result 
is that unless such data are included within the remit of our grammar formalisms, 
then no phenomenon at all will get complete coverage.
It is far from obvious how to address this ‘split-utterance’ phenomenon, given 
orthodox assumptions like the ‘autonomy of syntax’ hypothesis. The output of 
the grammar is standardly a set of structures inhabited by complete sentences, as 
input to some performance theory for further enrichment. But none of these frag-
ments will be included in the set of wellformed expressions, so a syntactic expla-
nation has no obvious starting point. There are problems for semantic accounts 
also, for interruptions are possible at any point, and in some cases so early that 
no intended propositional content is as yet fixable, so that accounts following the 
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Dalrymple et al. (1991) ellipsis resolution algorithm are not applicable without 
further assumptions:
(7) A: They X-rayed me, and took a urine sample, took a blood sample. Er, Mary
 B: Your sister?
 A: My sister, she insists. . . . . . .
There is the further problem that the participants may disagree, so that the follow 
on is not at all an attempt at collaborative completion:
(8) (A and B arguing:)
 A: In fact what this shows is
 B: that you are completely wrong.
Moreover, participants’ intentions may only emerge/develop during the ex-
change, so cannot be intrinsic to all communicative understanding, contra all 
standard assumptions about communication made by pragmatists (Grice 1975, 
Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995 etc.):
(9) A:  Oh. They don’t mean us to be friends, you see. So if we want to be . . .
 B: which we do
 A: then we must keep it a secret.
(10) (A mother, B son) 
 A:  This afternoon first you’ll do your homework, then wash the dishes and 
then
 B: you’ll give me £10?
In short, the phenomenon of context-dependence as posed by the data of conver-
sational dialogue is highly problematic for all orthodox assumptions. In this 
 paper we explore the extent to which the intrinsically dynamic perspective of 
 Dynamic Syntax gets a better handle on these data, and in particular these split-
utterances.
2  Dynamic Syntax: Addressing the context 
challenge
Dynamic Syntax (henceforth DS) is an action-based model of processing of which 
the core notion is incremental information growth following the time-linear flow 
of parsing/generation. Utterance contents, represented as binary tree-structures 
of predicate-argument form, are built up relative to context, and, similarly to 
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 performance accounts, central to articulating this concept of growth are concepts 
of underspecification and update. There is a range of types of underspecification: 
of content, of structure, and of structural relations. Indeed, this process of build-
ing up structure is what is taken to constitute natural-language syntax: syntactic 
mechanisms are procedures that define how parts of representations of content 
can be incrementally introduced and updated. The bonus of such explicit adop-
tion of a perspective in which the grammar reflects key properties of the dynamics 
of how language processing takes place is, as we shall see, that we have a natural 
basis for an integrated account of ellipsis.
2.1  Tree structures and tree-growth processes
The general process of parsing is taken to involve building as output a tree whose 
nodes reflect the content of some utterance – in the simple case of a sentence ut-
tered in isolation, a complete propositional formula. The input to this task, in 
such a simple case, is a tree that does nothing more than state at the root node the 
“goal” of the interpretation process to be achieved, namely, to establish some 
propositional formula (?Ty(t) in (11a) below, goals are represented with ? in front 
of annotations). For example, in the parse of the string John upset Mary, the out-
put tree in (11) to the right of the ↦ constitutes some final end result: it is a tree in 
which the propositional formula itself annotates the root node, and its various 
subterms appear on the dominated nodes rather like a proof tree in which all the 
nodes are labelled with a formula and a type:
(11) John upset Mary.
These DS trees are invariably binary, and, by convention, the argument always 
appears on the left branch, and the functor on the right branch (a pointer, ◊, 
identifies the node under development). Each node in a complete tree is anno-
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tated not with words but contents, i.e. terms of a logical language (e.g. Mary’, 
Upset’), these being subterms of the resulting propositional representation 
(Upset’(Mary’)(John’) holds at index S). The parsing task is to use both lexical 
 input, computational actions (e.g. Introduction and Prediction in step 1  in (12) 
below) and information from context to progressively enrich the input tree to 
yield such a complete output:
(12)
Parsing and production follow the very same processes, with but one further 
assumption: at every step in production, there must be some richer tree, (the goal 
tree shown as Tg in step 4  in (12) above), not necessarily fully propositional, 
which the tree under construction must subsume in the sense of being able to be 
developed into that goal tree by rules of the system. For the production of (11), for 
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example, each selected strategy for update as shown in (12), has to be checked 
for subsumption with respect to the goal tree Tg in step 4  representing the con-
tent to be conveyed. So parsers and producers are modelled as performing incre-
mental synchronised actions in that they use complementary but mutually avail-
able strategies for building up representations of content in context, either to 
establish interpretation for a sequence of words, or to find words which match the 
content to be conveyed. In this process, there may be partial specifications of 
trees (as in the non-final steps of (12), partial specifications of formulae (as for 
anaphoric expressions, which project but a place-holding metavariable, e.g. U, V, 
etc. to be updated from elsewhere), and even partial specifications of tree rela-
tions (long-distance dependencies, for example, involving initial projection of 
some “unfixed” node needing to be resolved later in the incremental derivation). 
Such incomplete specifications, across all parameters, are associated with goals, 
i.e. requirements for update (?X) that drive the tree growth process (see Cann et al. 
2005 for details).
2.2  Towards a dynamic concept of context
Turning now to what ellipsis data indicate, we will find that we have to see 
 ‘semantics’ as structured representations of content, ‘syntax’ as the set of actions 
for constructing these representations, and ‘context’ as a store of content, i.e. 
structures, plus the actions involved, hence the semantic representations and the 
syntactic process combined. For with these concepts in place, we anticipate that 
hearers/speakers can retrieve actions and content stored in context and  re-use 
them both to build up interpretation irrespective of which role they had previ-
ously been adopting; and a principled general account of ellipsis follows imme-
diately. More specifically, the types of information that ellipsis can pick up from 
context are of three basic sorts: content derived by some antecedent utterance (or 
extralinguistic information), the structure made available by some antecedent 
utterance, and the processes made use of by some previous utterance. We take 
each in turn.
2.2.1  Context-dependent processing (a): Recovery of content
The type of ellipsis construal familiar from the linguistics literature is that ellipsis 
can select terms from (linguistic) context:
(13) Q: Who upset Mary? 
 Ans: John did. (strict readings)
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We display this as follows:
(14) 
The formulation of this is exactly analogous to pronominal anaphora, though for 
some predicate type. The encoded expression projects a metavariable, U, of type 
(e → t), which then acts as trigger to license recovery of some appropriate content 
from the immediate context. It is notable that this commits us to the correct obser-
vation that ellipsis can be interpreted relative to the non-linguistic, indeed non-
verbal, context if the predicate is sufficiently salient (contra Hankamer and Sag 
1976 and others):
(15) (Parent to teenage son with surf-board standing in shallows:)
 I wouldn’t if I were you. The flag’s flying, so it’ll be dangerous
2.2.2  Context-dependent processing (b): Re-use of structure
In addition, the very structure made available by the immediate context can also 
be used, in some sense directly, with the respondent presuming on its avail-
ability as the point of departure for their own utterance. This is characteristic of 
question-answer pairs in particular:
(16) Q: Who did John upset?
 Ans: Himself.
 
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated | 129.215.19.197
Download Date | 7/15/13 12:19 PM
576   Eleni Gregoromichelaki et al.
As the above display shows, the structure is in some sense shared between 
 speaker and hearer in these exchanges, and the question is what that amounts to. 
In this case, this structure contains a specialised metavariable, WH, which the 
wh-expression is defined to provide as a place-holding device for a subsequent 
answer (see Kempson et al. 2001 ch. 5). In the reply this metavariable is replaced 
through the processing of a reflexive pronoun, which duly has to be identified as 
the term inhabiting the subject node. Hence the interpretation of the fragment as 
providing an answer to the question, by update of the very structure which it it-
self provides. As we shall very shortly see, it is this hand-over of structure which 
is characteristic of the split-utterance phenomenon.
2.2.3  Context-dependent processing (c): Re-using actions from context
It is not merely the output structure or content which interlocutors can make use 
of but also the actions which each of them may severally use in building up such 
representations, for it is such re-use which enables patterns of structure-building 
to be replicated without strict identity of the resulting content:
(17) A: Who hit himself?
 B: John did. Bill too.
In (17), as in (13), B’s (initial) answer involves the predicate-anaphoric device, the 
verb do, which constitutes a trigger to establish some appropriate predicate from 
what context provides. But in this case, it is actions recovered from context which 
yield that value (rather than some given predicate-formula as in the strict inter-
pretation). What is recovered are the actions lexically encoded in the verb hit im-
mediately followed by the actions encoded in the reflexive pronoun. As applied in 
the new environment provided by the ellipsis site – John did – this sequence of 
actions will again involve the projection of the two-place predicate hit’ and a 
place-holding metavariable at the object node, but the subsequent local identifi-
cation of that metavariable as subject will, in this new environment, ensure that 
the object node decoration will be John’. The result is the ‘sloppy interpretation’ 
‘John hit himself’. A similar pattern of reiterated actions can be applied also in 
interpreting the following add-on of Bill too – all without any repeat of the word 
himself to trigger such distinct local bindings. It is simply the selection of an ac-
tion sequence, as indicated by the type-specification of the trigger, which are 
taken over from context and reiterated.
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This re-use of actions is what underpins the broad array of ‘sloppy readings’ 
that linguists have identified:
(18)  John upset his mother. Harry too.
(19)  The man [who arrested John] failed to read him his rights. The man [who 
 arrested Tom] did too.
In all these cases, it is not the output content which is replicated, or needs ma-
nipulation in order to create some novel content: it is simply reiteration of actions 
stored in the evolving context of the emergent dialogue.
Context, thus, is defined in DS as involving both the sequence of partial trees 
and the formulae that annotate them, whether linguistically derived or not; and, 
crucially, the action sequences underpinning the transitions between them. With 
this rich concept of context, ellipsis can indeed be seen as the recovery from 
 context of information of these various types (for detailed analyses see Kempson 
et al. 2011).
2.3  Context-dependent processing: Co-construction in 
dialogue
The account of context as defined has, as a bonus, the prediction of seamless 
switching between speaker and hearer roles that is diagnostic of conversational 
dialogue. Unlike other frameworks, for which such split utterances pose very 
 considerable problems, under DS assumptions, this phenomenon is predicted to 
be wholly straightforward, indeed their existence is a consequence of the DS ac-
count of production (Purver et al. 2006). According to DS, the very same mecha-
nisms are used in production as in parsing, hence, tight coordination between the 
parties is expected. With each party modelled as building up structure incremen-
tally relative to context, at any point, they can switch roles making use of that 
individually constructed representation whether as parser or producer. So, even 
within a role transition and the first and second person pronouns switching inter-
pretation, the mechanism for processing them remains identical (see Purver et al. 
2010):
(20) A: Did you give me back
 B: your penknife? It’s on the table.
(21) A: I heard a shout. Did you
 B: Burn myself ? No, luckily.
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As these display, the context used by a participant as a hearer is exactly that of 
the context they use in their shifted role as a speaker and vice versa. By way of 
illustration, we take a simplified variant of (21):
(22) Ann: Did you burn
 Bob: myself?
Here, of course, the reconstruction of the string as *Did you burn myself ? is unac-
ceptable (at least with a reﬂexive reading of myself ), illustrating the problem for 
purely syntactic accounts of split utterances. But under DS assumptions, with 
representations only of structured content, not of putative structure over strings 
of words, the switch of person is entirely straightforward. Consider the partial 
tree induced by parsing Ann’s utterance Did you burn which involves a substitu-
tion of the metavariable (U) projected by you by the constant standing for the 
addressee/parser (Bob’):
(23) 
At this point, Bob can complete the utterance with the reﬂexive as what such an 
expression does, by lexical deﬁnition, is copy a formula from a local co-argument 
node onto the current node, just in case that formula satisﬁes the conditions set 
by the person, number and, here, participant role of the uttered reﬂexive. So, in 
this case, the restriction is that the metavariable stands for a local co-argument 
that is currently the speaker:
(24) 
Hence the absence of a ‘syntactic’ level of representation distinct from that of 
 semantic representations allows the direct successful integration of such frag-
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ments through the grammatical mechanisms themselves, rather than necessitat-
ing their analysis as sentential ellipsis (for detailed analyses see Kempson et al. 
2011; Purver et al. 2010).
We see then that the incorporation of the dynamics of structure-building in 
the grammar itself allows the required licensing of a considerably larger dataset. 
The split utterances, so signally ignored in accounts of ellipsis that purport to be 
a subpart of sentence-based grammars become core data, relative to which com-
peting grammars can be compared (see also Poesio and Rieser 2010; Ginzburg 
2012).
3  Grammars for linguistic processing and 
communication
With this sketch of ellipsis and the attendant concept of context, we now turn fi-
nally to what the concept of grammar that the DS system provides suggests about 
the nature of communication itself. In our view, the data presented here, as well 
as further dialogue phenomena such as self-corrections, restarts, backchannels, 
cannot be accounted for in a principled way unless foundational assumptions 
about the nature of grammar, and linguistic knowledge in general, are reconsid-
ered. All such phenomena require syntactic/semantic licensing but at a subsen-
tential level and display radical context dependence. In order to provide a prin-
cipled explanation then the grammar is defined in terms of mechanisms for 
word-by-word incremental parsing and production in context. ‘Syntax’ consti-
tutes constraints on tree growth, with lexical specifications inducing actions for 
tree growth. There is considerable significance in this shift of perspective. No con-
cept of sentence meaning is directly reconstructed. The system is, rather, a set of 
mechanisms for incrementally building content in context. An immediate conse-
quence is that the system is unencapsulated. Crucially, actions of tree-building 
induced by grammatical and lexical processes may be interspersed with prag-
matic actions of substitution and enrichment as driven by requirements associ-
ated with underspecified input.
There is a more radical consequence than this, as the structure-building 
 activity intrinsic to language use does not have to be modelled as reliant on mind-
reading. Speakers may, that is, start off without fixed intentions, contribute with-
out completing any fixed propositional content, and rely on others to complete 
the initiated structure, and so on. The potential of modelling these assumptions 
seems compatible both with psycholinguistic observations (Levelt 1989) and em-
pirical analyses of dialogue (Goodwin 1979).
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4  Emergent intentions
The fundamental role of intention recognition and the primary significance of 
speaker meaning in dialogue has been disputed in interactional accounts of com-
munication where intentions, instead of assuming causal/explanatory force can 
be characterised as ‘emergent’ in that the participants can be taken to jointly con-
struct the content of the interaction (Gibbs 2001; Haugh 2008; Mills and Grego-
romichelaki 2010; Mills 2011). This aspect of joint action has been explicated 
via the assumption of the “non-summativity of dyadic cognition” (Arundale and 
Good 2002; Arundale 2008; Haugh 2008; Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012) or in terms of 
“interactive emergence” (Clark 1997; Gibbs 2001). This view gains experimental 
backing through the observation of the differential performance of participants 
vs. over-hearers in conversation (Schober and Clark 1989) and the gradual emer-
gence of intentional explanations in task-oriented dialogue (Mills and Gregoromi-
chelaki 2010). Standard dialogue models, by contrast, are serial, modular and 
operate on complete utterances underpinned by a speaker plan and its recogni-
tion. This goes against the observation that, in ordinary conversation, utterances 
are shaped incrementally and ‘opportunistically’ according to feedback by the 
interlocutor thus genuinely engendering co-constructions of utterances, struc-
tures and meanings (see e.g. Lerner 2004). In our view, the main reason for this 
inadequacy in dialogue modelling are methodological assumptions justified 
by  the competence/performance distinction, separating the grammar from the 
parser/generator and the pragmatic modules, with the result that the grammati-
cal models employed lack the capability to fully manipulate and integrate partial 
structures in an incremental manner (for a recent incremental system see e.g. 
Poesio and Rieser 2010). In contrast, the view presented here can genuinely 
 model co-construction in dialogue even in cases where, as argued in Gregoromi-
chelaki et al (forthcoming), the grammar itself is the sole mechanism underpin-
ning the implicit performance of the speech act involved. In such cases, namely 
cases like (4) and (6), it is the set up of grammatical dependencies and their fulfil-
ment that drives the interaction rather than (meta)representation of speaker 
 intended speech acts.
5  Conclusion
The notion of emergent intentionality that can be modelled through an unencap-
sulated, incremental grammar that incorporates the dynamics of interaction is 
consonant with non-individualistic accounts of meaning (see e.g. Millikan 1984; 
Burge 1986). The advantage of such accounts is that, in not giving supremacy to 
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an exclusively individualist conception of psychological processes, they break 
apart the presumed exhaustive dichotomy between behaviourist and mentalist 
accounts of meaning and behaviour (see e.g. Preston 1994) or code vs. inferential 
models of communication (see e.g. Krauss and Fussell 1996). Instead, ascribing 
contents to behaviours is achieved by supra-individual social or environmental 
structures, e.g. conventions, ‘functions’, embodied practices, routinisations, that 
act as the context that guides agents’ behaviour. The mode of explanation for 
such behaviours then does not enforce a representational component, accessible 
to individual agents, that analyses such behaviours in folk-psychological mental-
istic terms, to be invoked as an explanatory factor in the production and interpre-
tation of social action or behaviour. Individual agents instead can be modelled as 
operating through low-level mechanistic processes (see e.g. Böckler et al. 2010) 
without necessary rationalisation of their actions in terms of mental state ascrip-
tions (see e.g. Barr 2004 for the establishment of conventions and Pickering and 
Garrod 2004 for coordination). This view is consonant with recent results in neu-
roscience indicating that notions like “intentions”, “agency”, “voluntary action” 
etc. can be taken as post hoc rationalisations rather than causally efficacious (for 
a survey see Wegner 2002).
Accordingly, we view coordination in dialogue as grounded in the control of 
(sub-personal, low-level) mechanisms like the “grammar”, which enable the pro-
gressive construction of structured representations to pair with the overt signals 
of the language. The content of these representations is ascribed, negotiated and 
accounted for in context, via the interaction among interlocutors and their 
 environment. From this perspective, constructing representations of the other 
participants’ mental states, rational deliberation and planning, though a possi-
ble means of securing communication, is seen as by no means necessary.
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